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ABSTRACT
The rise of the online gig economy alters ways of working. Mediated by algorithmically
programmed mobile apps, platforms such as Uber and Lyft allow workers to work by driving and
completing rides at any time or in any place that the drivers choose. This hybrid form of labor in
an online gig economy which combines independent contract work with computer-mediated
work differs from traditional manufacturing jobs in both its production activity and production
relations. Through nine interviews with Lyft/Uber drivers, I found that workers’ consent, which
was first articulated by Michael Burawoy in the context of the manufacturing economy, is still
present in the work of the online gig economy in post-industrial capitalism. Workers willingly
engage in the on-demand work not only to earn money but also to play a learning game
motivated by the ambiguity of the management system, in which process they earn a sense of
self-satisfaction and an illusion of autonomous control. This research points to the important role
of technology in shaping contemporary labor process and suggests the potential mechanism
which produces workers’ consent in technology-driven workplaces.

Key Words: Workers’ consent; Algorithmic management; Labor process

1

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I would like to give special thank to Professor Erik Larson, Professor Erika Busse-Cardenas,
Professor Shilad Sen, Professor Deborah Smith, Xuemeng Yao, Yaqing Lan, Qian Wang,
Qingyu Zhu, Hao-Fei Cheng, Qingyuan Jiang and peers in the Fall 2018 Sociology Senior
Seminar for their valuable advice and support on this project.

2

According to a recent review on the gig economy (Smith 2016), 8% of Americans
reported having worked for and earned money from the gig economy in 2015. Also referred to as
the platform economy, the on-demand economy or the sharing economy, the sector is
represented by platforms such as the ride-sharing platform, Uber and the home-sharing platform,
Airbnb. Unlike traditional workplaces, the gig economy creates a hybrid workplace that
combines independent contract work with online algorithmic-managed work. As increasingly
more people participate in the gig economy, its impact on work could be far-reaching.
The workplaces in the gig economy differ from traditional workplaces in many ways.
Work in the gig economy is usually independently contracted, geographically unbounded and
remotely distributed by platforms such as Uber and Amazon Mechanical Turk. There has been a
surge of scholarly interest on the “gig economy” in the past decade (Dillahunt 2017, Schor 2017,
Morgan 2018). While previous research has explored the growing precarity and suggested the
shift of financial risk from platforms to workers (Schor 2016, Kalleberg 2013), the subjectivity
of workers, which situate their own experiences in social relationships, has been under-explored,
leading us to ignore the crucial questions of how workers make sense of their work and the
cultural meanings of working a gig job.
In this project, I explore the experiences of online ridesharing platforms workers. By
studying cases of the two online ridesharing platforms, Uber and Lyft, through interviews with
workers, I address the research questions of how contract drivers, with no direct supervision, end
up consenting to the expectation of both the platforms and the riders. In simpler terms, do
motivations beyond monetary rewards generate drivers’ efforts in the online gig economy?
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This research is significant both theoretically and substantively. Theoretically, the
research extends theories of labor process control, which has primarily been focused on
traditional manufacturing jobs and service jobs into the context of online ridesharing economy, a
critical form of economy in the post-industrial capitalism. Although the labor process in the
online ridesharing economy differs from the traditional industries, I show that the outcome of
labor control remains the same. That is, workers' consent to work in the ridesharing economy is
still constantly produced.
Substantively, the research contributes to understanding how technology, specifically the
online gig platforms, has transformed workplaces. It fills in the gap in the previous literature in
the gig economy, which tends not to address workers subjectivity in the labor process in the gig
economy. However, it is not until we understand how workers make sense of their jobs that can
we accurately depict the power structure of such a workplace. The findings suggest that
technology, such as management algorithms, could occupy a dominant position in workers’
conception of the job. Characteristics of such technology could greatly influence workers’ work
experience and define workers routine. As more people enter the gig economy labor market, it is
crucial for us to have a scientific understanding on workers subjectivity in the labor process
within this new market, in order to protect the rights of online gig workers.
To explore the production of workers’ consent in the online ridesharing economy, the
paper is organized as follows. I will start by situating the study of labor process control in
ridesharing economy in the context of post-industrial capitalism and neoliberalism. Then, I
describe my research procedures, which are designed to explore the subjectivity of workers in
ridesharing platforms. In the findings section, I answer two questions: 1) To what are workers'
4

consenting? and 2) How is the consent produced in the labor process? To answer the first
question, I describe drivers’ efforts of working extended hours and providing quality passenger
experiences. To answer the second question, I first explain the framing of driving as
self-responsible entrepreneurs and the tension it creates among drivers, and then I explain the
learning games drivers are motivated to participate in trying to resolve the tension.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Questions such as “Why do workers continue to work?”, “How does management
achieve control over labor?” and “How does management increase the effort of laborers?” are
not unique in the context of online ridesharing platforms. In fact, these questions about labor
process control have been discussed by sociologists for a long time. In the section below, I first
lay out the historical responses from sociologists on the topic of labor process control. Then, I
identify the differences between workplaces structures in the gig economy and in the traditional
economy, which could lead changes to the labor process that affect the mechanism of labor
process control. Lastly, I identify the questions that current theories are unable to answer and
explain how this project addresses these gaps.

Investing in Work
The significance of labor process control cannot be discussed independently of the
context of capitalism. According to Marx, the labor process in capitalism in which workers turn
raw materials into useful objects is a product of class domination (Marx 1906). As a result,
organizations disempower workers in the labor process through labor process control
5

mechanisms to guarantee the continuous accumulation of profit in capitalist production. Thus,
labor is subordinated to the interest of capital, and organizations continue updating management
technologies to control the labor process and ensure the maximum profit.
As a result, labor control remains a central and necessary component for contemporary
social relations. Just as Marx said, “All means for the development of production transform
themselves into means of domination and exploitation of the producers.” (Marx 1906:708). As
we are exploring the labor process in the online ridesharing economy in the 21st century,
although the specific mode of production is not well captured by Marx, the fundamental logic of
accumulation in capitalism does not change.
In concrete reality, the form of labor control shifts as the labor process changes (Burawoy
1983). In his original articulation of labor process theory, Marx considered coercion as the
fundamental way of labor control. However, coercive power is not sufficient to motivate
workers’ continuous effort, as workers can opt out the labor process and choose another site in
the market. After the rise of mass production, Braverman furthered the argument by identifying
the mechanism of labor control as deskilling, in which skilled workers are replaced by machines
and the remaining unskilled workers have little control over production (Braverman, 1998).
These strictly materialist explanations of labor process control, however, fall short of
providing a complete account, as they do not explain workers’ subjective consent, which “elicit
cooperation in the pursuit of profit” (Burawoy 1979: 30). Agreeing with the necessity of labor
control in the capitalist production process, Burawoy explained that labor control is completed
through more subtle mechanisms in which workers’ consent is “manufactured” (1979). By
giving workers a certain degree of control in their manufacturing work, organizations framed the
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work process as a game of making out. In the machine shop Burawoy studied, workers were not
only motivated by the financial reward of the piece-rate system but also motivated by the
psychological satisfaction that they could gain by winning the game of making out. According to
an interpretation of Burawoy by Occhiuto, “the game of ‘making out’ allowed workers to
construe themselves as skilled laborers, which was significant in the context of the hierarchical
relationship between workers and management” (2017:272).
Burawoy’s research emphasizes the importance of examining the labor process as two
interrelated components, namely production activities, which affect the “transformation of labor
power to labor” and production relations, which are the relationships that workers enter as they
entering the job, both with co-workers and with managers. His research suggests that the social
relations that workers experience in the production process shape the way they make sense of the
work. Thus, worker consent is a collective product that works, in part, by creating a distinct
social meaning of work to the workers. The meaning, however, is only created in the process of
production, as workers enter and develop their social relations in the workplace. In other words,
Burawoy points out that rather than only selecting workers who consent to the work before they
start working, it is the process of making out and negotiating during the work that produces
consent among the workers in manufacturing workplaces. More importantly, by playing the
game, workers also consent to the rules of the game, which subjects themselves to the
exploitative logic of capitalism.
The labor process further shifts in post-industrial capitalism. More recent studies extend
the metaphor of the “game” into the context of the service industry. Similar to the manufacturing
industry where Burawoy conducted his research, Sherman observed that doormen and
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receptionists also subscribe to hotel “games” during their work (2007). Through playing the
game of maximizing their tip and minimizing their work, service workers establish themselves as
skilled and autonomous professionals. One change of the workers’ game in the service industry,
however, is viewing the guests as the “agents of production”, which makes the labor process
more unpredictable to workers (2007:112). The uncertainty in the labor process, which used to
comes from the behavior of the machines, is now created by customers’ actions and demands.
Consequently, the labor relationship between service workers and managers also shifts from
having contrary interests in the “game” to having aligned interests.

Transformed Workplaces in Gig Economy
To understand the broad research question of how the rise of the online gig economy
affects the labor process and worker subjectivity, it is essential to first understand how the gig
economy provides infrastructure for labor that differs from traditional workplaces. Four criteria
define platforms in the gig economy: (1) the use of information technology to facilitate
peer-to-peer transactions, (2) the use of user-based rating systems, (3) flexibility in workers’
working hours, and (4) worker-provision of the tools and assets necessary to provide the service
(Telles 2016). Although the definition is neither sufficient nor necessary (Schor 2017), it
identifies some of the essential characteristics of the platforms, which helps us to analyze the
research topic addressed in this project -- the work experiences of workers in the gig economy.
Among the four defining features, criteria (3) flexibility of working schedule and (4)
investment of personal assets in work allow workers in the gig economy a degree of structural
autonomy, which is not present in traditional workplaces. Criteria (1) the use of information
8

technology and (2) rating systems introduce the algorithmic management paradigm. Especially,
the online gig economy often uses algorithmic control solely without any in-person managerial
infrastructure, which differs from the traditional service economy.
As I will show below, both components of the labor process that were emphasized by
Burawoy, production activities and production relations are altered in online ridesharing
platforms, compared to traditional workplaces. It is thus important to answer the question of how
the online ridesharing platforms might change the labor process and workers subjectivity. That
is, how are workers motivated differently to commit to the work process in ways that facilitate
profit?
Structural Autonomy - the flexibility of work hours and locations: The flexibility of work
hours and locations is one of the most frequently mentioned characteristics of the gig economy.
Drivers of Uber and Lyft are legally independent contractors who receive a 1099 form, the
payment report form that IRS requires businesses to use for non-employees (Smith & Leberstein
2015). In practice, neither of the platforms explicitly restricts workers’ hours and working
locations (Uber 2018, Lyft 2018). Drivers drive in their own cars and can start accepting rides
whenever or wherever they open the mobile app for the corresponding platform. Once they
indicate in the mobile app that they are willing to start accepting rides, the app will assign a
nearby passenger request to the drivers. The contract between drivers and the platforms does not
start until they accept a ride and each contract often only lasts for less than an hour. The
platforms also do not mention the possibility of deactivating drivers’ accounts after a certain
length of inactivity (Uber 2018, Lyft 2018). As a result, workers can choose to be “on-demand”
based on their own availability of time and location.
9

The formal structural autonomy of the ridesharing platforms attracts drivers. In a survey
conducted among Uber drivers in 2014, 87% of the participants indicated that they choose to
drive for Uber “to be my own boss and set my own schedule.” Moreover, 85% chose “to have
more flexibility in my schedule and balance my work with my life and family” (Hall & Krueger
2018). In fact, multiple empirical studies have also reported that the flexibility of work schedule
and location is a primary motivation for drivers to choose ridesharing platforms as either a
full-time job or part-time job (Lee 2015; Raval & Dourish 2016). In-depth interviews with Uber
drivers showed that workers value both the temporal and location flexibility offered by the gig
economy because it facilitates the combination of gig work with other alternative employment
(Wood et al. 2018).
The structural autonomy that Uber and Lyft give to their drivers significantly changes the
labor process, precisely the production relations. As independent contract workers, Uber and
Lyft drivers are removed from the network of managers and peer workers, which commonly
exists in traditional manufacturing and service jobs. Consequently, common features thought to
produce workers’ consent—peer competition and an internal labor market—do not apply for
ridesharing workers. In fact, Sallaz suggests that independent contract workers in call centers
only show short-term effort towards their work, rather than long-term consent, precisely because
they are not situated in a hierarchically structured workplace (2015). In his study of taxi drivers
in New York, Occhiuto also argued that the schedule flexibility gives drivers structural
autonomy, which generates drivers’ effort, not through the social relations within their
workplaces, but their personal social relations - driving a taxi allows them to fulfill other
aspirations for personal development (2017).
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Although previous studies have discussed the way independent contract work changes the
mechanism of labor process control, they have not addressed the change with consideration of
the specific production activities in the ridesharing economy. The relations of production and
production activities, however, are “concretely inseparable components” of the labor process
(Burawoy 1978:15). Thus it is integral to consider how the specific combination of the two in the
gig economy affects the mechanisms of labor process control.
Algorithmic Management - work assignment algorithm and rating system: The
productive activities in Uber and Lyft, driving, are primarily organized by the management
algorithms that distribute, manage and evaluate the work process. Both Uber and Lyft assign
rides to drivers through their work assignment algorithms. The algorithms are proprietary and not
transparent to drivers, but one feature the algorithms include is driver’s ratings. Drivers are rated
by passengers after each ride, based on passengers’ subjective satisfaction. Besides the regular
earnings for each ride, drivers also have chances to get rewards from the platforms. The rewards
might be doubling the amount earned for a particular ride or providing a particular dollar value
bonus for completing a given number of rides. However, the assignment of the rewards
continuously changes and is also decided by algorithms.
While the adoption of algorithmic management appears arbitrary and seems to be a
natural result of the advance of technology, I would argue that the gig economy platforms’
increasing reliance on algorithmic surveillance technology is, in fact, a reflection of the
accumulation logic in a capitalist society. The computer-mediated process enables platforms to
collect “pervasive and continuous” data from workers (Zubuff 2015). Furthermore, the Internet
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connects different sources of data, allowing an “assemblage of surveillance” which could
accumulate information from different surveillance sources (Lyon 2001).
The use of algorithmic management might intensify the exploitation in the labor process.
On a micro level, the work assignment algorithm, which is widely adopted in the gig economy
platforms, appears to be optimized based on a supply-demand relationship but fails to address
workers’ feeling and pace of work (Lee 2015). On a macro level, sociologists demonstrate that
algorithmic management facilitates and legitimates exploitation by creating information
asymmetries that disempower workers in the bargaining process with both platforms and
customers (Rosenblat & Stark 2016, Wood et al. 2018, Graham et al. 2017).
Zuboff uses the term “surveillance capitalism” to illustrate the fact that with the help of
surveillance technology, the company has more power to control, define and make a profit from
the labor process (2015). In the case of Uber, with the constant flow of data recorded by the
platform as part of algorithmic management, the platform not only monitors drivers who fail to
achieve production goals, it also easily tracks those who exceed the production standard, which
gives companies information to adjust personalized production goals to make profit from labors
most effectively (Lyon 2001).
Rosenblat and Stark identify the specific ways such profit-maximization algorithm
management is reflected in the Uber driver app (2016). Such ways include requiring drivers to
accept ride requests blindly, controlling the surge pricing, and using rating systems in the work
assignment algorithms. As a result, under algorithmic management, drivers can work whenever
they want, but the information asymmetry between platforms and workers induces workers in a
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competitive market to drive during certain hours and locations through monetary rewards
(Rosenblat and Stark 2016, Wood et al. 2018).
As the traditional labor control mechanisms including coercion and deskilling seem to
lose their effectiveness, algorithmic management has been argued to be the alternative to the
labor process management strategy in the gig economy. However, such arguments seem to rely
on the assumption that only monetary rewards can motivate workers. The analysis emphasizes
that the system relies on monetary rewards and takes it for granted that drivers will follow the
surge pricing or accept rides blindly because they want to maximize their earnings.
Paradoxically, more than half of the gig workers appear not to be dependent on the earnings from
driving. According to the Pew research center, 44% of gig workers have full-time jobs outside
the gig economy (Smith 2016). Also, analysis of Uber’s data reveals that the average pay for an
Uber driver is $13.25 per hour in three U.S. major cities, which is only slightly higher than
minimum wage (O'Donovan & Singer-Vine 2016).
As indicated by Burawoy, workers’ consent in the labor process might be produced by
something other than financial gain. Workers’ cultural understanding of the work also plays a
role in continuing to motivating drivers. For example, evidence shows that some drivers report
the fun of meeting new people as well as the desire to give back to the community as more
important reasons for driving than the extra income they make (Lee 2015).
Overall, the online ridesharing economy creates a unique workplace for us to reassess the
concept of workers' consent. However, the extant literature is unable to provide a complete
account of the labor process control mechanism in the ridesharing economy, as it fails to
consider workers subjectivity in the context of the particular production activity. Thus, the
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current study extends Burawoy’s account of manufacturing consent to the gig economy by
studying the case of Uber and Lyft. When both the relations of production and the nature of
production activities change significantly, do workers still consent to the labor process? If it is
still the case, how is the consent produced similarly or differently?

DATA AND METHODS
Employing the extended case method (Burawoy 1998), I use the case of online
ridesharing platforms, specifically Uber and Lyft, to reassess the theory of the production of
workers’ consent. Following the analytical framework of “manufacturing consent” described by
Burawoy (1979), I examine the case of Uber and Lyft by collecting data on workers’ subjectivity
in the labor process and analyzing data in the context of their relations of production and
production activities.
To gain a comprehensive understanding of the subjectivity of platform drivers, I collected
data for this project by interviewing Uber and Lyft drivers. Interviews allowed me to focus on
the process of production, where workers’ consent is produced (Burawoy 1979), rather than the
prerequisite and the outcome. Interviews also allowed me to investigate how people “experience
themselves as good, valuable, worthwhile people” in the labor process (Lamont and Swidler
2014:159). In the interviews, I asked drivers about their decision-making process in driving, their
relations with passengers and their perceived relations with the ride-sharing platforms. These
questions allowed me to focus on the nuanced emotions of platform drivers and addressed
questions such as how drivers make sense of their work.
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In his original research, Burawoy collected his data from participant observation as a
worker in a manufacturing factory. However, I purposefully chose to collect my data through
interviews rather than participant observation, considering the particular work routine on the
online ridesharing platforms. Uber or Lyft drivers drive in their own cars and decide when to
work based on their own schedules. Thus, it would have been unrealistic to find any consistent
time and location to observe drivers’ work activities. Moreover, the labor relations involved in
the online ridesharing work are not only between drivers with passengers but also drivers with
the management platforms, which would have been hard to obverse without asking drivers to
describe the relations explicitly. In comparison, interviews are more effective in getting drivers
to answer why and how they consent to the job.
To recruit interview participants, I adopted a mix of convenience sampling and snowball
sampling. I started with drivers in my personal network. Then I posted a recruitment flyer in
multiple public Facebook groups, including a neighborhood Facebook group and the Uber/Lyft
driver Facebook groups in the city I reside in. I also invited drivers whom I met after taking Uber
or Lyft rides. For all interviewees, I also asked participants to recommend other drivers who may
be willing to participate.
I conducted all but one interview in person in a coffee shop. Since customers’ ratings for
drivers after each ride can directly affect drivers’ reputation and thus consequently affect drivers
economic gain (Lee 2015), I intentionally decided to conduct interviews at a separate time from a
ride. Removing the conversation from the power dynamic of me being a customer improves the
likelihood that the answers I gathered are genuine, rather than intentionally crafted in desirable
ways.
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In October 2018 and March 2019, I conducted nine interviews in total. The participants’
ages range from 21 to 60, and careers range from students to retired professionals. Seven
participants identify as male, and two identify as female, which is representative of the
population of Uber/Lyft driver as a whole (Hall & Krueger 2018). Due to my sampling methods,
drivers in my sample are all part-time drivers, driving 10-20 hours each week. All of them,
except for one identify as middle or upper middle class. Thus, the sample is biased towards
drivers who do not depend on Uber as their only income source. However, since the current
research is meant to investigate the cultural motivation of engaging in the gig economy, a sample
that does not drive Uber for necessity will likely to elicit more significant responses.

FINDINGS
Uber and Lyft drivers are entirely on their own to decide when to start driving and how to
complete each ride. However, it is surprising that all drivers in my interviews are motivated to
commit to driving. In the first part of the findings section, I describe the ways that drivers
commit to their jobs by driving for extended periods of time and giving good services to their
riders. In the second part, I explore why drivers follow such a consistent normative standard. I
argue that consent is produced through a learning game where drivers seek to discern the
workings of the platform. I show that the structural autonomy in the platforms allows drivers to
internalize a rhetorical discourse of self-responsible entrepreneurship. However, the obscure
algorithmic management in the ridesharing platform contradicts with drivers’ desire to be
self-responsible, which is framed by the entrepreneurial discourse. The tension thus motivates
drivers to continue to engage in the learning games curated by the ridesharing platforms, through
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which the rules of the workplace become seemingly discoverable. As a result, by participating in
the learning games, drivers generate consent to driving, to be emotionally engaged in driving and
to the logic of exploitation.

Investing One’s Self in the Online Gig Economy
I observed that drivers in the two online ridesharing platforms consent to work in two
ways: 1) they commit to driving regularly for a substantial number of hours and 2) they aim to
provide quality service to riders.
The time commitment to driving: Among the eight participants I interviewed, people
drive for 15 hours, on average, each week on top of their busy schedule of full-time professional
jobs or college life. Although the specific time of the day when drivers choose to work varies
from person to person, the amount of time they spend in driving Uber/Lyft, however, invariably
occupies a significant amount of time in their life. It is typical for my interviewees who have
full-time jobs to drive Uber/Lyft for 6-30 hours each week. As one participant complained about
the change of lifestyle that driving Lyft brought to him, “I don't have a lot of free time. I don't
have a lot of free time, to begin with. I spent a lot of time driving and put a lot of miles on my
car.” He would usually drive during weekday nights, holidays or weekends, which, in the past,
had been the time to spend with family before he started driving Lyft. For weekday nights, he
usually goes back home, changes, gets the car ready and goes out to drive. In some ways, he is
voluntarily extending his working hour outside the 40-hour regular standards, which many
organizations in the traditional workplaces have failed to do.
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Drivers not only choose driving over family and leisure time but also choose it over other
on-demand jobs that might have a higher or equal pay compared to Uber/Lyft. Participants
mentioned they have also tried other platforms such as UberEats or Grubhub, but they did not
like it and decided to continue with Uber or Lyft.
Personalized quality service: Another observation that illustrates drivers’ consent to the
work is that almost all drivers I interviewed strive to create “the best experience” for riders. In
other words, drivers not only consent to drive continuously and regularly but also consent to
provide personalized quality service to passengers.
In my interviews, almost all Uber/Lyft drivers go beyond the basic service that they are
required to provide for passengers. In preparing the car for service, some drivers intentionally
keep the vehicle clean and smelling good; some provide phone chargers; some provide snacks.
From the drivers’ perspectives, driving for the platforms is an integrated performance where
there is both the technical component of driving safely, but also the service of making riders feel
good. In explaining how she prepares her car before taking rides, one driver describes:
I would always dress up, I would dress like this or better. And I would do nice things like
in the dead of winter, I would have a little pile of blankets what we call lap blankets,
because when I would pick up young women in downtown, who have been clubbing,
they don't wear a coat because it doesn't go with their cute little dress. But when it’s
seven degrees below zero, even if you’re just running from the club to the car, it’s
freezing cold. And the guys too - they don’t wear coats and I would just say “there's a
pile of lap blankets there, feel free to get yourself warm” and people were astonished that
I would do that and I would just think about my own children doing this and how I would
want them to be warm under these conditions.
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In comparing passengers to one’s children, the diver also compares the relationship between
passengers and her to a parental, caring relationship. Although the intimacy levels may vary
significantly, both relationships are the ones that she cares generously and the ones for which she
is willing to go beyond the required service.
The service is also highly personalized. Drivers define the standard of good service
differently depending on the particular characteristics of passengers. Almost all participants
mentioned the importance of “reading riders”. As one participant phrased it as follows.
What I found important is, what I called, reading the passenger. You will have some
passengers that they don’t want to talk. They just want to be on their phone. And I also
have some passengers who want to talk. So being sensitive what is best for them, that’s
what I will do. And that makes life better for them. They would tip more and feels better.
Neither driving regularly nor ‘reading riders’ is explicitly required by Uber or Lyft as of the job
descriptions. However, drivers invariably perform the production activities that align with the
interest of the ridesharing platforms.
Admittedly, the tipping system set up by the online ridesharing platforms might be
interpreted as one of the motivations for drivers to invest their valuable time into working.
However, financial motivations cannot fully explain the reason for such time and emotional
commitment in working, as the financial gain is not as appealing as we would expect in drivers’
perceptions. After accounting for the gas and vehicle maintenance, the financial incentives
provided by Uber/Lyft are not that great. As indicated by an Uber driver, who has been driving
for a year and a half and drives for 20 hours each week on average
Financially, I think it’s a big toss-up whether it’s worth it financially or not. If more
people tipped it would be, but as I said, it’s unusual for people to do so. I figure after all
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expenses I may be making ten or eleven dollars an hour. Is that worth it? I don’t know.
It’s more than I earn watching television, I guess. But, yeah, I think it’s a question.
For drivers, the ridesharing platforms are more than the sites where they passively accept and
complete tasks to earn money. By describing the driving activity in comparison with watching
TV, the driver is indicating a sense of her personal investment in the work of driving. Without
direct supervision and required minimum driving hours, Uber and Lyft are sites where drivers
are willing to invest a significant amount of time from their weekly schedule to as well as
provide personalized quality services for passengers.

How is consent produced?
Intensive personal and emotional investment in driving is common for Uber and Lyft,
despite not being part of their job requirement defined by the platforms. Why do drivers invest
more than the minimum effort required by the platform? In other words, what are the relations of
production and production activities in the labor process that produce workers’ consent in the
online ridesharing platform? I will answer the question by describing two perspectives drivers
use to make sense of their driving experience. First, the driving experience gives drivers
structural autonomy by providing a flexible work schedule, which creates an entrepreneurial
discourse that encourages drivers to be self-responsible. Second, the platforms, however, do not
provide enough support and transparency to allow drivers to experience themselves as
entrepreneurs. As a result, drivers continue to participate in a learning game in which they hope
to ultimately be able to master the game rules. The consent to platform driving is thus produced
in the process of drivers trying to overcome the uncertainty of the system.
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Structural autonomy produces a self-responsible entrepreneurial discourse: U
 ber and
Lyft drivers drive in their own vehicle and can control when and where they want to work. The
structural autonomy becomes one of the most important attractions to drivers because it allows
drivers to fulfill other aspirations in their personal development (Occhiuto 2017). However, the
significance of structural autonomy lies in not only its flexibility but also the sense of control
over life that it creates for drivers. Compared to traditional workplaces which have rigid
structures, the loose structure of Uber and Lyft gives drivers a sense of agency, the feeling that
they have self-control over their work and life.
The nice thing about Lyft or Uber is that you set your own hours. I don’t have to call
anybody and ask, “May I drive? I need more hours and need more money, can I work this
weekend?” If I decide that I want to drive, I get in my car and I drive. If I’m tired and I
think I don't want to do this anymore, I stop. It doesn’t matter what time it is, I stop. So
again I have decision-making control over when, where, mostly where, where to start,
where to stop, how much.
The structural autonomy that Uber and Lyft give to drivers, including control over working time
and working location is precisely the thing that management controls in traditional workplaces.
Other structural characteristics such as the piece rate system and the fact that drivers own their
car also contribute to shaping drivers’ agency over their driving experience. Drivers not only
appreciate how much they earn, but how they earn it and the fact that they can choose when to
earn it.
When ridesharing platforms give drivers decision-making authority of when to work,
drivers feel like they own their work. Driving becomes a business that drivers can self-manage
and self-control. It is in this sense that drivers see themselves as entrepreneurs in their own
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workplace. In my interviews, most drivers do not see themselves as part of the platform. As a
result of the rhetoric of self-control entrepreneurs on the ridesharing platforms, drivers also feel
entitled to make decisions in their daily interaction with passengers. A participant describes how
she picks up passengers as,
I am driving in my own car, and so it is a familiar space and a comforting space for me. I
have the right as a driver to make a decision of whether I am going to pick up an
individual, so if I drive up and they are very very drunk, for example, or sick I don’t have
to pick them up. So I have the legal right to make somebody get out of my car. And so
that was helpful as well.
Drivers appreciate the structural autonomy which gives them self-control over their work.
However, structural autonomy also legitimizes the need to be self-responsible. Uber and Lyft
drivers consider themselves to be responsible for dealing with all situations in their driving
experiences. They feel the responsibility for things as small as keeping the car clean and finding
the right route to as big as whether the passenger has a good experience or not. A participant
describes how he decides his working hours. “what I found is if I don’t see myself in the mood, I
won’t go out driving. Because it just won’t be as enjoyable for them or for me.” Not only the
physical space is important, but the relational interaction is also important for defining a good
passenger experience. Internalizing the rhetoric of self-responsible entrepreneur, drivers question
their work when they cannot take full control over the work.
Beyond daily interaction with passengers that drivers feel they need to be responsible for,
drivers also feel self-responsible for getting enough rides, although it is technically not their
responsibility, but the algorithms’ responsibility.
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The structural autonomy that ridesharing platforms provide not only encourages drivers
to take self-control over their work, but also creates rhetoric of being a self-responsible
entrepreneur, which drivers internalize. Drivers say that they “are not working for the platforms,
but for themselves.” They feel like they need to be self-responsible for their work. “The
characteristics of neoliberal entrepreneurship are repeated in various forms of compulsory
individual self-management and self-administration” (Hardt & Antonio 2017: 210). However,
being self-responsible for work is not at all an easy thing for drivers. Drivers find themselves
need to constantly deal with the uncertainty created by the algorithmic management system on
ridesharing platforms.
Navigating the uncertainty of the algorithms by engaging in a Learning Game Drivers’
self-management, however, is not as easily achievable as it appears to be on the surface. While
Lyft and Uber give drivers the full right to decide when to start driving and where to start
driving, the specific passenger that drivers pick up is assigned by a work assignment algorithm.
While drivers may develop a set of guidelines for themselves in interacting with passengers, the
actual pay of each ride is completely dependent on what ride is assigned to them by the
algorithm. A bonus system also complicates the earnings on the platform. The ridesharing
platforms periodically release various form of bonuses, such as an earnings guarantee after
completing a certain number of rides. These bonuses then become important parts of the drivers'
work strategy.
Despite its importance to Uber/Lyft drivers’ income and driving experience, Uber and
Lyft never release details of their work assignment algorithms, making it a black-box. In Uber’s
video guide for drivers on how to take trips, by stating “The app automatically finds your ride
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requests, so it’s easy to find your next trip.”, the platform omits details on how the rides are
assigned. This low level of transparency drastically sacrifices certainty in the driving experience.
Drivers have little information about the destination of the next ride, who is coming into the car,
and how much exactly they are going to earn after each ride. Based on the demand for rides in a
certain geographical area, both platforms adjust the rate of each ride. Drivers naturally want to
pursue the surge zones where they get a higher return for each ride. This is not always possible,
according to a driver:
I drove one Friday night and really didn’t like it. It was hard! I thought I would go out
and make a lot of money, but it was frustrating because you would pick someone up
downtown or something which has just gone out and they’re in the surge zone but they
may ask to go to like Place A or they might ask to go to Place B wherever. And then
you’re out of it and then you would get linked to someone who’s like way out in the
suburbs. And it’s hard to get back downtown, so I found like on those nights it was just
really chaotic. The algorithm or something must not have been very good.
The work assignment algorithms create uncertainty in the driving experience, which frustrates
drivers. In fact, drivers play a very passive role in picking rides. In both platforms, the app gives
drivers 15 seconds to decide when a request got matched with the driver. However, only the
estimated time of the ride is given in the 15 seconds, not the actual destination of the ride. It is
only after drivers accept the ride that they know where they are going. Drivers complain that the
15 seconds is not enough for them to make the decision, especially when they need to make the
decision while there is still another passenger in the car and they are still driving.
These uncertainties in the driving experience contradict strongly with the self-responsible
entrepreneurial rhetoric which they have internalized through the experience of structural
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autonomy. A driver who has worked in the service industry describes the difference between the
two jobs,
So with Lyft and other gig economy things, you have to be pretty independent. You don’t
have a manager you can go to; you don’t have a set schedule of hours guaranteed; you
don’t have a guaranteed income based on your hours.
He describes driving Lyft as full of uncertainty and the instability, which creates frustration. To
counter the frustration created by the tension between structural autonomy and algorithmic
control, drivers engage in a learning game, trying to figuring out ways to circumvent the
uncertainty. A participant, who has been driving for Uber and Lyft for two years, finds certain
times during the day can give him more certainty in the face of uncertainty.
I’ll get out at about 6:30 or 7:00 and drive till about 9:30 and then go out again at around
4 till about 7. In this way, I can get more frequent demands. Because you don’t know the
length of the ride, that cannot be part of the calculus, but what is in the calculus is what
are the odds of you getting a ride.
He reports regularly going to a drivers’ Facebook page to read and participate in the discussion
around driving strategies. He also keeps track of his driving income in a spreadsheet, which
allows him to find out the number of rides he completes each hour (two and a half rides, on
average). By learning and trying to figure out the patterns of the algorithm, drivers gain extra
certainty to their work. In learning the game and playing the game, drivers perceive themselves
as competitive players, who try to win the game and understand the system. In this learning
game, what matters to the drivers is how much they understand the algorithms and how well they
can take advantage of the algorithms.
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In playing the game, drivers also learn to take advantage of the bonus system. Leveraging
the rules that they learn about the algorithm, drivers are able to develop strategies that increase
their control over the driving experience.
What this is saying is that, if I take 25 rides during this period of time [of an earning
guarantee bonus], they will guarantee that I make $225. So for instance, if you think
about the math, 25 rides then that comes out to about $9 per ride, even a short ride.
Without this, it only pays me three dollars and 37 cents each ride.
Drivers learn the rules quickly by doing calculations or experimenting. Through trial and error in
more and more driving experience, drivers learn the rules and start to be able to align themselves
with the self-responsible entrepreneur. However, Lyft and Uber regularly change and adjust their
management algorithms. Whenever changes happen, drivers need to relearn the game.
It [the earning guarantee bonus] stopped now. For the last two weeks I haven't gotten
them and I've been talking to the Lyft people that I know I said it because it’s completely
arbitrary whether or not they will give the bonus to you. They claim they base it on your
driving record but I haven’t seen anything in the last two weeks, and I’m upset, because
this is an important part of the strategy.
In the pursuit of self-control over their work, the learning games for drivers never end. In
learning the game and playing the game, drivers perceive themselves as competitive players,
who try to win the game and get the most of out the system. They are not competing with other
drivers. Instead, they are competing with themselves in a sense that the more experience they
have driving, the more likely they desire to become the true entrepreneur. They come up with
strategies that can maximize their outcome and minimize their effort. For example, they develop
knowledge on the profitability of certain destinations. They learned that more attention should be
paid to more picky passengers, since they have a higher chance of give low ratings. However, it
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is at the same time that they engage themselves in the system of labor process of ridesharing
economy, where the uncertainty never goes away. In the process of searching for a particular
way of optimizing earnings from this work assignment algorithm, drivers do the calculation and
perform production effort.

CONCLUSION
Through my interviews with nine Uber or Lyft drivers, I found that drivers consent to the
working process by working extended hours and providing quality services. The mechanisms of
the production of consent, though, varies from Burawoy’s observation in the manufacturing
factory. Ridesharing platforms leverage the rhetoric of being a self-responsible entrepreneur and
carefully curate a workplace where drivers align themselves with the rhetoric as they engage in
the labor process intensively and learn the rules of the platforms. The constant contradiction
between the illusion of control and the algorithmic uncertainty becomes a continuous motivation
for drivers to stay engaged in the labor process.
Forty years ago, Burawoy observed the way manufacturing factories manipulate the
production relations to produce workers' consent to organization’s profit-making process in the
context of industrial capitalism. In Burawoy’s term, “The significance of creating a game out of
the labor process, however, extends beyond the particularities of making out. The very act of
playing a game generates consent to its rules.” (1979: 82). Forty years later, the current research
shows that although the specific production relations and the production activities have changed
in post-industrial capitalism, the outcome of the labor process remains the same. While the
online gig economy is appearing to give workers structural autonomy that is unprecedented and
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positively valued by workers, the labor process is still subject to the logic of accumulation in
capitalism and exploiting the works in the system. No matter how the specific means of
production changes, the labor process is subordinated to the interest of capital and the control of
labor process is in place to ensure the reproduction of class relations (O’Neill 1986).
The mechanism of producing workers' consent, though, changes dramatically as we shift
into the labor process of online gig economy. The management algorithm that drivers work with
on a daily basis can have a profound impact on drivers understanding of the work, coupling with
the rhetoric of self-responsible entrepreneurs. However, unlike the peer social network that
produces workers' consent in traditional manufacturing factories, management algorithm can be
much more easily scaled and constantly adjusted and thus affect millions of workers in the
nation. Furthermore, the use of a management algorithm hides the managerial purpose of the
corporate platform and eliminates access for workers to bargain with managers, who used to
work with the workers together in traditional workplaces.
It is thus important to go beyond the elements of evaluating work quality that has been
theorized traditionally, such as pay rate, work hour and office dynamics etc. In refining
regulation for these emerging workplaces, it is important for policymakers to look at the labor
process more comprehensively and in a more relational way. Questions such as, what power
structures are the workers subject to become an important question to ask in improving workers
right. Take the example of online ridesharing platforms: when algorithms become the dominant
source of management, it is not enough to consider drivers’ pay rates. Rather, policymakers
should also consider the accountability and transparency of the management algorithms to give
more protection to drivers.
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There has been a constant debate on whether the labor model that emerges from the
online gig economy produces good jobs or not. Scholars endorse the labor model in the gig
economy for the flexibility it allows for individuals (Occhiuto 2017) but criticize the labor model
for its low pay and irregular hours (Wood et al. 2018). However, what is missing from this
debate is the consideration of workers subjectivity. The finding for the current research adds
complexity to the debate by showing that workers in gig economy consent to the labor process
by giving meaning to the work they do. By taking workers’ agency into consideration, the
research suggests that the evaluation of whether the gig economy produces a good job or bad job
should not be simplified to two extremes. The features claimed to make the jobs “good” such as
autonomy also are the features that give rise to the characteristics that make the jobs “bad.”
The limitations of this study suggest productive directions for future research. First, the
fact that I have only interviewed part-time drivers might give reason to pause about how much
we can generalize the findings. The tension between the value of autonomy and the uncertainty
in the system might be more salient to my interviewees, who do not rely on Uber or Lyft as the
primary source of livelihood, compare to drivers who driver Uber or Lyft on a full-time basis.
Second, while the current study examines workers agency in their workplaces, I did not
manage to situate their subjectivity in their informal workplace network due to the limitations of
my research methods. Burawoy suggested that workers’ status among peer workers on the shop
floor is significant in the production of consent. Although drivers do not have peer workers in
their formal workplace network, they might develop informal networks outside their daily
driving experiences. Multiple drivers mentioned their use of Facebook group in exchanging
information about driving. Thus, future research could observe the social dynamics in such
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informal networks, which might add more nuance to the understanding of the labor process. For
example, once we can observe the labor process in workers informal social network, we might
find that the dominant position of management algorithm in producing workers' consent is not
universal. While some personal social network might enhance the effect of management
algorithm on producing workers' consent, the other might weaken it.

30

Bibliography:
Braverman, Harry. 1998. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the
Twentieth Century. N
 YU Press.
Burawoy, Michael. 1979. Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under
Monopoly Capitalism.U
 niversity of Chicago Press.
------. 1983. "Between the Labor Process and the State: The Changing Face of Factory Regimes
Under Advanced Capitalism." American Sociological Review:587-605.
------. 1998. "The Extended Case Method." Sociological Theory 16(1):4-33.
Dillahunt, Tawanna R., Xinyi Wang, Earnest Wheeler, Hao F. Cheng, Brent Hecht and Haiyi
Zhu. 2017. "The Sharing Economy in Computing: A Systematic Literature Review."
Proc.ACM Hum.-Comput.Interact 1:1-38.
Graham, Mark, Isis Hjorth and Vili Lehdonvirta. 2017. "Digital Labour and Development:
Impacts of Global Digital Labour Platforms and the Gig Economy on Worker
Livelihoods." Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 23(2):135-162.
Hall, Jonathan V., and Alan B. Krueger. 2018. "An Analysis of the Labor Market for Uber’s
Driver-Partners in the United States." ILR Review 71(3):705-732.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2017. Assembly. Oxford University Press.
Kalleberg, Arne L. 2013. "Globalization and Precarious Work." Contemporary Sociology
42(5):700-706
Lamont, Michèle, and Ann Swidler. 2014. "Methodological Pluralism and the Possibilities and
Limits of Interviewing."Qualitative Sociology 37(2):153-171.
Lee, Min K., Daniel Kusbit, Evan Metsky and Laura Dabbish. 2015. "Working with Machines:
The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human
Workers.":1603-1612.
Lyft. 2018. "Help page for Lyft drivers.".
(https://help.lyft.com/hc/en-ca/categories/115002009967-Driving-with-Lyft).
Lyon, David. 2001. Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life.M
 cGraw-Hill Education
(UK).
Marx, Karl. 1906. Capital A Critique of Political Economy.
Morgan, Bronwen. 2018. "The Sharing Economy." Annual Review of Law and Social Science
14(1):351-366
O’Donovan, Caroline, and Jeremy Singer-Vine. 2016. "How Much Uber Drivers Actually
make Per Hour." BuzzFeed News 23:2016.
31

Occhiuto, Nicholas. 2017. "Investing in Independent Contract Work." Work and Occupations
44(3):268-295
O'Neill, John. 1986. "The Disciplinary Society: From Weber to Foucault." British Journal of
Sociology: 42-60.
Raval, Noopur, and Paul Dourish. Feb 27, 2016. "Standing Out from the Crowd." Proceedings
of the 19th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work & Social
Computing: 97-107
Rosenblat, Alex, and Luke Stark. 2016. "Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A
Case Study of Uber’s Drivers.".
Sallaz, Jeffrey J. 2015. "Permanent Pedagogy." Work and Occupations 42(1):3-34
Schor, Juliet B., and William Attwood-Charles. 2017a. "The “sharing” Economy: Labor,
Inequality, and Social Connection on For-profit Platforms." Sociology Compass
11(8):e12493.
Sherman, Rachel. 2007. “Games, Control, and Skill” Class acts: Service and inequality in
luxury hotels. Univ of California Press.
Smith, Aaron. 2016. Shared, collaborative and on demand: The new digital economy.
Smith, Rebecca, and Sarah Leberstein. 2015. "Rights on Demand: Ensuring Workplace
Standards and Worker Security in the on-Demand Economy." National Employment Law
Project, September.
Telles Jr, Rudy. 2016. "Digital Matching Firms: A New Definition in the “sharing Economy”
Space." ESA Issue Brief ( 01-16):1-27.
Uber. 2018. "Help page for Uber partners.". (https://help.uber.com/partners).
Uber. 2018. "How to take trips.". (https://www.uber.com/drive/basics/how-to-take-trips/).
Wood, Alex J., Mark Graham, Vili Lehdonvirta and Isis Hjorth. 2018. "Good Gig, Bad Gig:
Autonomy and Algorithmic Control in the Global Gig Economy." Work, Employment and
Society:0950017018785616.
Zuboff, Shoshana. 2015. "Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an
Information Civilization." Journal of Information Technology 30(1):75-89.

32

